the degree to which they value the goals that trait serves. This permits them to justify the behavior (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997) . Selfperception theory (Bem, 1972) As habitual patterns of perceiving reality and behaving, traits are likely to be brought "online" more spontaneously, set off almost automatically by the context. Trait inferences and attributions may be activated automatically when forming impressions of the personality of politicians. They may therefore be more important than values as determinants of liking for politicians. A match between voters' own personality and the personality they attribute to a candidate would create or strengthen the bond between the voter and candidate. The policy positions of a party may also reverberate with particular individual traits. Emphases on using force to quash terror or on free enterprise to overcome poverty, for example, may reverberate with persons high on the dominance trait. Thus, voters' own personality characteristics may make particular candidates or parties appear more appealing to them. Roccas et al. (2002) further theorized that values are likely to trump traits as predictors of responses when the degree of voluntary, intentional control over a decision or judgment is high. In support of this view, values predicted approximately five times as much variance in religiosity as traits did. This is because values represent motivations cognitively in the form of desirable goals and objectives that people can pursue intentionally. The trade-off among competing values that are implicated simultaneously in a behavior or attitude gives direction to that behavior or attitude (Schwartz, 1996 (Schwartz, , 2005a . Personal values should predict people's voting choices more powerfully than traits do, because such choices are intentional and typically entail thoughtful processing. People weigh alternatives and their implications in light of the personal standards that guide their behavior.
Complex, thoughtful processing of values might be expected to characterize voters who are more rather than less cognitively sophisticated. If we take education level as a proxy for cognitive sophistication, values might relate more strongly to political choice among university-educated voters. We examine this possibility.
An abundant literature reports relations of specific values that are relevant in the political domain to political attitudes and choice (e.g., Feldman, 1988; Knutsen, 1995; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Rokeach, 1973; Zaller, 1992) . This literature has not considered even more basic values that may provide the grounding in personality for such political values as humanitarianism, materialism, and traditionalism. Schwartz (1994) argues that combinations of basic values underlie specific political values and ideologies. The latter may mediate the effects of basic values on political choice but basic values are more fundamental. Basic personal values may enable people to organize their political evaluations in a relatively consistent manner; they can provide a general structure to political attitudes (Feldman, 2003) . This structuring process is another path through which basic values may influence voting. Converse likened values to "a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs" (1964, p. 211).
The particular values that structure ideological discourse depend upon the issues that are central in a given political context. In the Israeli political arena of 1988, for example, where protection of religious practice competed with free expression of a secular lifestyle, the key values that differentiated party supporters were tradition versus self-direction (Barea & Schwartz, 1998). In her study of 14 countries, Barea (2003) found that, where political competition revolved around issues of national security versus equal rights and freedoms for all, the key values whose relative priorities structured voters' preferences tended to be security and conformity versus universalism and self-direction. Where the focus of political competition revolved around the distribution of material resources, the key values tended to be universalism and benevolence versus power and achievement.
In sum, while we expect traits to predict voting, our overarching hypothesis is that personal values have primacy over traits. This hypothesis comports with a view of personality as a proactive self-regulating, agentic system operating in the pursuit of own goals (Bandura, 1997 (Bandura, , 2000 Caprara & Cervone, 2000) . After analyzing the political context in Italy at the time of this study, we specify the particular traits and values hypothesized to predict voting.
The causal order linking values to behavior is a key issue in values research (e.g., Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994 Table 1 follows this circle. Tests of the theory in more than 200 samples from 67 countries largely support both the content of the 10 values and the structure of relations among them (Schwartz, 1992 (Schwartz, , 1994 (Schwartz, , 2005a Thus, voters' personalities tend to be congruent both with the personality profile their coalition's leader projects and with the political priorities of the coalition. This congruence may be due to actual correspondence between voters' political preferences and their self-reported personality and/or to voters assimilating their preferred candidates' personalities to their own. In either case, two mechanisms might account for the link of traits to voting. First, the similarityattraction paradigm suggests that voters feel more attracted to a leader or coalition whose personality and policies they perceive as more congruent with their own personality. This attraction, in turn, inclines them to vote for the leader or coalition. Second, voting serves an expressive function for voters. By voting for a coalition whose programs they perceive as congruent with their own actual or ideal traits, voters actively express and affirm that they themselves possess the traits they wish or believe they have. Leaders reinforce the link between voters' personalities and their political choices by projecting the traits that voters value.
The images and policies of the two coalitions and leaders in the 2001 elections were similar to those in 1994. Therefore, in keeping with past findings, we hypothesized that center-right supporters in the 2001 elections would be higher than center-left supporters in energy and conscientiousness and that center-left supporters would be higher in friendliness and openness. The effect-sizes for personality traits in the 1994 elections were quite small (Caprara et al., 1999), perhaps because the two coalitions were not strongly distinguished on most issues. Because this situation persisted in 2001, we anticipated that associations with voting would be weak.
To generate hypotheses for personal values we assessed the implications of the policy differences between the coalitions for value attainment. As noted, the center-right placed particular emphasis on entrepreneurship and the market economy, security, and family and national values. The expected consequences of such a policy are compatible with power, security, and achievement values. But they may harm the opposing values in the value circle, universalism and, perhaps, benevolence. The latter values call for promoting the welfare of others even at cost to the self. In addition, universalism values express concern for the weak, those most likely to suffer from market-driven policies.
In contrast, the center-left advocated social welfare, concern for social justice, equality, and tolerance of diverse groups, even those that might disturb the conventional social order. To assess actual prediction, if only of future vote, we replicated the analyses with this indicator of political choice. We also assessed whether values related more strongly to political choice among more sophisticated voters. For this purpose, we predicted 2001 vote separately in the subsamples of universityeducated vs. less-educated respondents.
Statistical Analyses
We calculated point-biserial correlations, controlling demographic variables, between voting and each of the 10 BFQ facets and 10 PVQ values to test the hypothesized relations. We used the 10 BFQ facets or subdimensions rather than the five domain scales to have an equal number of values and personality traits for comparing their predictive power. We examined the impact of traits and values on political choice with hierarchical logistic regression. In the regression, we first controlled age, gender, income, and education. We constructed three dummy variables for education-elementary school, junior high school, and university (senior high school omitted as the reference group). We then examined whether the set of traits and/or the set of personal values explained significant additional variance4 in voting and whether any one set of variables took primacy over the others.
To avoid capitalizing on chance, we adjusted the alpha level for individual tests in the logistic regressions downwards, according to the number of predictors 4 The goodness-of-fit index in the logistic regression is the Nagelkerke R2. 
Results

Correlations of Traits and Values with Political Choice
We hypothesized that voters higher in friendliness and openness and lower in energy and conscientiousness would support the center-left as compared with the center-right coalition. This hypothesis assumed that voters perceived the leader of the center-left coalition as higher in friendliness and openness and as lower in energy and conscientiousness than the leader of the center-right coalition. At the second data-gathering period, respondents rated the personalities of the coalition leaders on a list of adjectives that serve as markers of the Big Five traits. The expected differences in perceptions were all confirmed (all p < .001).5
We computed point-biserial correlations of voting with the 5 traits and 10 facets, controlling gender, age, income, and education. In the combined sample from the three periods (n = 2,849), the correlation with friendliness (.15,p < .001) supported the hypothesis, as did the correlations with its two facets, cooperativeness (.14, p < .001) and politeness (.11, p < .001). The correlation with openness (. 11, p < .001) also supported the hypothesis, as did the correlations with its facets, openness to culture (.08, p < .001) and openness to experience (.09, p < .001). The correlation with energy (-.07, p < .001) also supported the hypothesis, but this reflected only its dominance facet (-.10, p < .001) and not its dynamism facet (-.01). The correlations with conscientiousness (.06, p < .01) and its facets (scrupulousness .05, p < .01, persistence .04, p < .05) were also in the hypothesized direction. Voting did not correlate with emotional stability (.01) or with its facets of emotion control (.00) and impulse control (.02). The correlations of voting with each of the five traits and their facets were similar at each of the three data-gathering periods.
With regard to values, we hypothesized that voters who value universalism and benevolence more and power, security, and achievement less would support the center-left as compared with the center-right coalition. More specifically, we expected voting to correlate most positively with universalism values and most negatively with power values. Moreover, based on the motivational continuum that organizes values, we predicted an integrated pattern of relations between voting preferences and the whole set of value priorities. We expected correlations to decline from most positive for universalism values to most negative for power values in both directions around the motivational circle of values (Figure 1) . We computed point-biserial correlations of voting with the 10 values, controlling gender, age, income, and education. We centered individuals' value responses on their own mean for all 40 items to eliminate individual differences in use of the response scale. In the combined sample, as hypothesized, the pointbiserial correlation of universalism with voting for the center-left rather than center-right (.28, p < .001) was the most positive, and the correlation for benevolence (.18, p < .001) was positive too. The hypothesized negative correlations were also significant-security -.20, power -.14, and achievement -.08 (all p < .001)-though it was security rather than power that correlated most negatively. Table 3 presents the correlations of voting with the 10 values separately for each data-gathering period. The pattern of correlations is largely similar at the three post-election intervals.
The hypothesized pattern of relations between voting preferences and the whole set of value priorities was also confirmed. The Spearman rank correlation between the expected and observed order of correlations around the value circle, starting at universalism, is 1.00 for the total sample and .95, .94, and .96 for the 9-, 19-, and 27-month periods, respectively (all p < .001). Figure 2 portrays the pattern of correlations for the total sample. It reveals the sinusoidal shape expected based on the motivational continuum of values (Schwartz, 1992) .
Logistic Regression
The logistic regression coefficients we report are odds ratios (OR). They indicate the effect of a one-unit change in a predictor variable on the odds that a person preferred the center-left coalition (coded 1), holding all other predictors constant. Thus, coefficients greater than 1 indicate that the higher people's score We view basic personal values of the type studied here as expressions of personal ideologies that organize core political orientations (Feldman, 2003; Schwartz, 1994) . When politicians emphasize their commitment to "social justice" (universalism) or to "family values" (tradition and security), they are appealing to the basic values that shape individuals' attitudes toward specific ideological issues. Parties seeking broad support often clothe their aims in language that hides contradictory value claims. They profess to favor a free market (power and achievement) and social welfare (universalism; e.g., Italy's Alleanza Nazionale), or promise to battle terrorism (security and power) and protect freedom (selfdirection). Knowledge of the congruencies and conflicts inherent in the circular motivational structure of the 10 basic values can help analysts and politicians alike to identify contradictory or coherent ideological stands.
Both traits and values have long been considered relevant to political choice, but little attention has been paid to how they operate in concert. The current research built upon taxonomies of traits and values with welldocumented cultural generality and usefulness across domains of action. Our findings corroborate a social cognitive view that assigns primacy to values over traits in the course of actions and choices that entail thoughtful weighing of alternatives, currently or in the past. Personal values can serve to operationalize the personal standards and goals that the social cognitive view sees as critical guides to behavior. Placing values within the social cognitive theoretical framework that specifies their role in the functioning of human agency gives values broader heuristic value. The primacy of values over traits in the current context is noteworthy both for research on political reasoning and choice and for research on personality functioning.
Sociologists note a general individualizing of society in the democracies of the Western World (e.g., Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Ester, Halman, & de Moor, 1994). They argue that higher education and greater geographical and occupational mobility have weakened people's bonds to their traditional social groups and to the ideologies and parties these groups endorse. Education and mobility encourage people to formulate more autonomous social and political views rather than to adopt packaged views from groups to which they feel little allegiance. Presumably, voluntary lifestyle groups (sports, music, travel) are increasingly important. They are less linked to ascribed groups and their interests and more expressive of personal values and preferences. People's distinctive attitudes towards self and life serve more as the compass that orients their behavior. Our evidence that basic personal values and traits have greater relevance than demographic group memberships in orienting political choice in Italy adds to this picture of individualization.
